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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TITLE VII AND
THE NLRA: "GETTING OUR ACTS TOGETHER"
IN RACE DISCRIMINATION CASES
MARK
I.

D. ROTHt

INTRODUCTION

N RECENT YEARS, THE COURTS HAVE PLACED THEIR
OWN GLOSS on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title
VII),1 by interpreting its terms to impose on those under its ambit a
broad duty not to practice certain forms of discrimination, and by
inflicting strict sanctions for violation of this duty. 2 The judicial
decisions under Title VII gradually have put meat on the skeleton of
discrimination law. At the same time, however, these decisions have
created a substantial amount of confusion in the area of race
discrimination in employment,3 because the employment relation4
ship is also governed by statutory schemes other than Title VII.
This article will only deal with the interrelationships between Title
t A.B. Syracuse, 1972; J.D. University of Toledo College of Law, 1975; LL.M.
(expected) Georgetown University Law Center, 1978. Member of the District of
Columbia and Massachusetts Bars.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§2000e - 2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
2. See, e.g., Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 424 (1975) (employer
may not deny employee back pay where to do so frustrates Title VII's purpose of
eradicating discrimination); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)
(employer's conditions to employment that employee have high school diploma or
pass intelligence test violate Title VII where the conditions are not job related); Carey
v. Greyhound Bus Co., 500 F.2d 1372, 1378 (5th Cir. 1974) (employer's seniority
system, although neutral on its face, violated Title VII because it perpetuated past
discrimination in job classifications); Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491
F.2d 1364, 1375 (5th Cir. 1974) (good faith efforts by employer to remedy past
discrimination is not a defense to a Title VII claim for back pay).
3. Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of "color,
religion, sex, or national origin ....
" 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1) (1970 & Supp. V.
1975). However, the scope of the present article is limited to only that aspect of Title
VII which deals with race. For discussions of the other forms of discrimination
prohibited by Title VII, see generally Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise:Griggs v.
Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination,71 MICH. L. REV. 59
(1972); Das, Discriminationin Employment Against Aliens, 35 U. PITT. L. REV. 499
(1974); Jones, The Development of the Law Under Title VII Since 1965: Implications
of the New Law, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1976); Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered:
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824 (1972);
Comment, Title VII - Pregnancy and Disability Payments: Women and Children
Last, 44 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 381 (1976); Comment, Religious Observance and
Discriminationin Employment, 22 SYR. L. REV. 1019 (1971); Note, A Woman's Place:
DiminishingJustificationsfor Sex Discriminationin Employment, 42 S. CAL. L. REV.
183 (1969); Note, 9 CREIGHTON L. REV. 795 (1976).
4. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1970 & Supp. V
1975); Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1970 & Supp. V 1975); Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§621-634 (1970 & Supp. V
1975); Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 657-678 (1970).

(68)
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VII and one of these other specific regulators of employment
5
discrimination, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
Title VII has been interpreted to impose broad, strict, and
exacting duties upon employers and unions; nevertheless, Title VII
6
and NLRA remedies have not been found to be mutually exclusive.
The courts have encouraged alleged discriminatees to pursue concurrently every legal avenue and remedy arguably available to
them.7 However, the courts have neglected to define the relationship
between Title VII and the NLRA with sufficient clarity, particularly
in the context of the NLRA's imposition on unions of a duty of fair
representation 8 - a major source of employment discrimination
litigation. 9 The confusion in the cases involving this duty have
rendered this area of the law a veritable minefield.
Prior to the enactment of Title VII, the duty of fair representation was perhaps the most effective method of barring and
sanctioning discriminatory union practices. 10 However, with the
passage of Title VII, the principal purpose of which is the

5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (originally enacted as National

Labor Relations Act; Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (Wagner Act), amended
by Labor Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (TaftHartley Act), amended by Act of October 22, 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-189, 65 Stat. 601,
amended by Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73
Stat. 519 (1959) (Landrum-Griffin Act), amended by the Fair Labor Standards
Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 59 (1974)).
See Meltzer, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination:
The More Remedies, The Better?, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1974); Comment, The
Inevitable Interplay of Title VII and the National Labor Relations Act: A New Role
for the NLRB, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 158, 158-60 (1974).

6. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1974)
(discharged employee's right to sue for Title VII violations not foreclosed by prior
submission of his claim to final arbitration under collective bargaining agreement).
For a discussion of the Alexander case, see notes 171-87 and accompanying text
infra. The Sixth Circuit, in Tipler v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125 (6th
Cir. 1971), held that the Title VII suit before it was not bound under the principles of
res judicata or collateral estoppel by the decisions of the National Labor Relations
Board (Board) in a prior adjudication of the same facts. Id. at 128-29.
7. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47-49 (1974). For a
discussion of this case, see notes 171-87 and accompanying text infra.
8. The duty of fair representation is not contained in the NLRA; rather, it was
first created by the Supreme Court in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S.
192 (1944). For a discussion of the Steele case, see notes 33-49 and accompanying text
infra. See also Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. REV. 151 (1957).
9. See e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B.
181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). For a discussion of
Miranda's holding that a union's breach of the duty of fair representation constitutes
an unfair labor practice under the NLRA, see notes 75-83 and accompanying text
infra.
10. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953); Syres v. Oil Workers
Union, 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955), rev'd per curiam, 350 U.S. 892 (1955); Larus &
Brother Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 1075 (1945).
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elimination of discrimination in employment, 1 the necessity for, and
effectiveness of, the NLRA as an alternative, overlapping, or parallel
avenue of relief has been questioned by some commentators. 12 It also

has led generally to great confusion among the bodies that attempt
to define, reconcile, and coordinate the responsibilities of the
National Labor Relation Board (Board) 13 and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 14 Quite clearly, the roles of
the Board and the EEOC with respect to alleged racially discriminatory conduct by unions and employers are still in a process of
evolution. Meanwhile, however, much to the chagrin of some, the
limited resources and manpower of the Board have been forced into
areas unquestionably within the coverage and protection of Title
VII.15
To the extent that the Board's resources are limited and manpower is pressed, difficult choices may lie ahead as to which
discrimination cases, if any, are to be pursued by the Board, if its
traditional responsibilities are not to suffer. This article will attempt
to return to the original source of the duty of fair representation and
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), (c) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). Subsection 703(a) of Title
VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national

origin.
Id. § 2000e-2(a). Similarly, subsection 703(c) provides:
It shall be an unlawful practice for a labor organization(1) to exclude or expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate
against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership or applicants for
membership, or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any
individual, in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities, or would limit such employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
individual in violation of this section.
Id. § 2000e-2(c).
12. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 3, at 31; Meltzer, supra note 5, at 2-3; Note, The
National Labor Relations Board and Title VII: The Impact Of Mansion House And
The Case For Minimal Board Involvement, 7 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 126, 140-46
(1975) [hereinafter cited as The Impact of Mansion House]; Note, 29 OKLA. L. REV.
974, 986-87 (1976).
13. The Board is the agency charged with administering the NLRA. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 153 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
14. The EEOC is responsible for the administration of Title VII. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-4, 2000e-5 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
15. See Meltzer, supra note 5, at 14.
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trace the historical and present scope of the duty in race discrimination cases.
Presently, it is the responsibility of the Board to reconcile the
confusion and uncertainty surrounding its role by establishing a
viable and sensible identity consistent with the principal purpose of
the NLRA. Hopefully, this article will provide some guidance for the
Board in its effort to eliminate racially motivated discrimination in
employment without sacrificing its traditional effectiveness in
6
preventing and resolving labor disputes.1
II. PURPOSES OF THE NLRA
The question posed by the interrelationship of Title VII and the
NLRA is not whether the elimination of racial discrimination from
American society is an important national goal. As the Supreme
Court recently has stated in another context,1 7 "it clearly is."18 Nor
is there any uncertainty that Congress has authorized the Board to
combat such discrimination. The courts have expressly acknowl20
edged this authority, 19 as has the Board itself.
Rather, the relevant questions are: 1) to what extent must the
Board assume an active, aggressive role in race discrimination cases
brought under the NLRA which also fall clearly within the scope of
the EEOC's Title VII jurisdiction; and 2) to what extent will the
Board's assumption of an active or aggressive role in such cases
interfere with its ability to perform its principal functions under the
NLRA. 21 In view of these questions, the proper starting point of the
present analysis is an examination of the Board's primary role, as
22
manifested by the purposes for which the NLRA was adopted.
The original version of the NLRA, which is commonly referred
to as the Wagner Act, 23 was enacted by the 74th Congress on July 5,
1935. Section 1 of the Wagner Act 24 states in pertinent part:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to
eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the
16. For a discussion of the Board's traditional role under the NLRA, see notes
23-28 and accompanying text infra.
17. See NAACP v. Federal Power Comm'n, 425 U.S. 662 (1976).
18. Id. at 665.
19. See, e.g., United Rubber Workers Local 12, 150 N.L.R.B. 312, 314-15 (1964),
enforced, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967). See also Wallace
Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 251 (1944); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S.
192, 199 (1944). For a discussion of the interrelated impacts of these last two cases, see
notes 33-53 and accompanying text infra.
20. See generally Independent Metal Workers Local 1,147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964);
Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181'(1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 1172 (2d Cir.
1963).
21. See notes 23-28 and accompanying text infra.
22. Cf. NAACP v. Federal Power Comm'n, 425 U.S. 662, 669-71 (1976).
23. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol23/iss1/4

4

Roth: The Relationship between Title VII and the NLRA: Getting Our Acts
[VOL. 23: p. 68

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these
obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the
practice and procedure of collective bargainingand by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, selforganization, and designation of representatives of their own
choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and condi25
tions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
26
In passing the Wagner Act and its subsequent amendments,
Congress apparently sought to promote a free and fair collective
bargaining system as an alternative to the labor strife of previous

decades. 27 To this end, the NLRA is intended to maintain a delicate

balance between employers, labor organizations, and employees for
the benefit of the public as a whole.2 8 It remains to be examined,
however, where racially discriminatory conduct by any of these
groups specifically fits into the NLRA's statutory scheme.
III.

THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION AS AN

UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE UNDER THE

A.

NLRA

Origin of the Duty

The nexus between the NLRA and racially discriminatory
behavior is the duty of fair representation that is imposed on labor
organizations. 29 The duty of fair representation has been defined by
the Supreme Court 3° to be:
[A] statutory duty fairly to represent all of those [bargaining
unit] employees both in its collective bargaining

. . .

and in its

enforcement of the resulting collective bargaining agreement
....
Under this doctrine, the exclusive agent's statutory
authority to represent all members of a designated unit includes
a statutory obligation to serve the interests of all members
without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its
discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid
31
arbitrary conduct.
25. Id. (emphasis added).

26. The NLRA was first amended in 1947, by the Labor Management Relations
Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), also commonly called the Taft-Hartley
Act, which, inter alia, added a new subsection setting forth seven union unfair labor
practices. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)-(7) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The Board is empowered
under the NLRA to prevent any person from engaging in unfair labor practices. Id.
§ 160 (1970). For the citations to the subsequent amendments of the NLRA, see note 5
supra.
27. See Affeldt, Group Sanctions and Sections 8(b)(7) and 8(b)(4): An Integrated
Approach to Labor Law, 54 GEO. L. J. 55 (1965).
28. See id. at 63.
29. See Cox, supra note 8, at 156.
30. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
31. Id. at 177.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1977

5

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1977], Art. 4
1977-1978]

RACE DISCRIMINATION

CASES

It was through this duty of fair representation that the Board
originally became actively involved in policing the employment
relationship regarding acts of racial discrimination. 32 Interestingly,
however, review of the express language of the NLRA reveals that
the term "duty of fair representation" is not found therein. The duty
of fair representation is a judicially created concept which has been
read into the NLRA by the Supreme Court of the United States.
The term was first used in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville
33
Railroad.
In Steele, the petitioner, a black locomotive fireman,
brought suit under the Railway Labor Act 3 4 against his employer
and the union, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and
Enginemen, for entering into a collective bargaining agreement that
discriminated against blacks. 35 Petitioner asserted that the majority
of the railroad's firemen employees were white and that the white
majority had chosen the union to represent the craft. 36 Blacks were

excluded from union membership. 37 The Court summarized the
petitioner's charges thusly:
The Brotherhood has acted and asserts the right to act as
exclusive bargaining representative of the firemen's craft. It is
alleged that in that capacity it is under an obligation and duty
imposed by the [Railway Labor] Act to represent the Negro

firemen impartially and in good faith; but instead, in its notice
to and contracts with the railroads, it has been hostile and

32. See Clark, The Duty of FairRepresentation: A TheoreticalStructure, 51 TEX.
L. REV. 1119, 1120 (1973); Cox, supra note 8, at 156-57; Meltzer, supra note 5, at 3-4;
Comment, Having the Fair Representative Doctrine: An Effective Weapon Against
Union Racial Discrimination?,24 MD. L. REV. 113, 146 (1964).
33. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
34. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163 (1970). The fourth paragraph under § 2 of the Railway
Labor Act, id. § 152, which was the section applied in Steele, contains a representation
provision very similar to that found in § 9(a) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
For the pertinent part of § 2 of the Railway Labor Act, see note 39 infra. See also Cox,
supra note 8, at 151. According to the Supreme Court in Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323
U.S. 248 (1944), § 9(a) of the NLRA was the original source of the duty of fair
representation under the NLRA. Id. at 255-56. For a discussion of § 9(a) of the NLRA
and Wallace, see notes 50-53 and accompanying text infra.
35. 323 U.S. at 195. The agreement provided that: 1) not more than 50% of the
firemen in each class of service in each seniority district of a carrier should be black;
2) until the 50% white quota requirement was reached, all new runs and all vacancies
should be filled by white men; and 3) the employment of blacks in any seniority
district in which they were not working was not to be sanctioned. Id. Moreover, the
union reserved the right to negotiate for further restrictions on the employment of
black firemen with the individual railroads. Id. Subsequently, the union did enter into
a supplemental agreement with the railroad employer, which controlled the seniority
rights of black firemen and restricted their employment. Id. The black firemen were
not given notice or opportunity to be heard with respect to either of these agreements.
Id. at 195-96.
36. Id. at 194-95.
37. Id. at 194.
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disloyal to the Negro firemen, has deliberately discriminated
against them, and has sought to deprive them of their seniority
right and to drive them out of employment in their craft, all in
order to create a monopoly of employment for Brotherhood
8
members.

3

The specific issue addressed in Steele was whether or not section
2 of the Railway Labor Act 39 imposed on a labor organization that

was acting by authority of the statute as the exclusive bargaining
agent of a class of railway employees 40 a judicially enforceable "duty
to represent all the employees in the craft without discrimination
because of their race. ' 41 The Steele Court held that a duty of fair
representation was implicit in a union's status as the exclusive
bargaining representative of all bargaining unit employees. 42 The
Court reasoned that the statutory grant of exclusive representative
powers carried with it as a quid pro quo the duty to exercise the
power in the employees' interest and behalf "without hostile
discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good faith. ' 43 The extent
of this duty was regarded as "at least as exacting a duty to protect
equally the interests of the members of the craft as the Constitution
imposes upon a legislature to give equal protection to the interests of
those for whom it legislates.

'44

Noting the constitutional ramifications that inevitably would
arise from a failure to recognize a duty of fair representation, 45 the
Court based its recognition of the duty in the language of the statute
38. Id. at 196-97. Petitioner specifically alleged that because of the agreement, he
was twice reassigned to longer, more arduous, and less remunerative work, and was
both times replaced by a white union member who was junior to him and no more
qualified. Id. at 196.
39. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1970). The fourth paragraph of § 2 provides in pertinent part:
"Employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing. The majority of any craft or class of employees
shall have the right to determine who shall be the representative of the craft or class
for the purposes of this chapter." Id.
40. See id.
41. 323 U.S. at 194.
42. Id. at 204.
43. Id. The Court considered this duty to be "inseparable from the power of
representation." Id.
44. Id. at 202.
45. Id. at 198-99. The Court specifically noted an equal protection problem:
If ... the [Railway Labor] Act conferred this power [to enter into contracts
fixing rates of pay and working conditions] on the bargaining representative of a
craft or class of employees without any commensurate statutory duty toward its
members, constitutional questions arise. For the representative is clothed with
power not unlike that of a legislature which is subject to constitutional
limitations on its power to deny, restrict, destroy or discriminate against the
rights of those for whom it legislates and which is also under an affirmative
constitutional duty equally to protect those rights. If the Railway Labor Act
purports to impose on petitioner and the other Negro members of the craft the
legal duty to comply with the terms of a contract whereby the representative has
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itself.4 6 In addition to the fourth paragraph of section 2, 47 which
gives employees the right to organize and bargain collectively
4 8 the Court concluded that other
through a class representative,
paragraphs in this section plainly manifested a congressional intent
that the chosen representative "is to act on behalf of all the
employees which, by virtue of the statute, it undertakes to repre49
sent."
It is clear that the statutory duty of fair representation
emanated from the Steele case. Since Title VII is now also available
to remedy race discrimination by unions, the present scope of that
duty must be determined; and it is to the Steele decision that one
should look to arrive at this determination.
On the same day that the Steele opinion was issued, the
Supreme Court also decided Wallace Corp. v. NLRB. ° In Wallace, in
the context of a NLRA suit based on union affiliation discrimination, 51 the Court imposed a duty of fair representation essentially
identical to the one articulated in Steele on labor organizations
selected as the exclusive bargaining representatives under section
9(a) of the NLRA. 52 The Court held that
the duties of a bargaining agent selected under the terms of the
[National Labor Relations] Act extend beyond the mere
discriminatorily restricted their employment for the benefit and advantage of the
Brotherhood's own members, we must decide the constitutional questions which
petitioner raises in his pleading.

Id.
46. Id. at 199-200.
47. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1970). For the relevant portion of this paragraph, see note 39

supra.
48. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1970).
49. 323 U.S. at 199, citing Railway Labor Act, § 2, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1970). It is

important to note that, although the constitution of the union in Steele included a
provision that excluded blacks from membership, the Supreme Court did not address
the issue of the legality of racial discrimination in union membership. See 323 U.S. at
194. Section 703(c) of Title VII now specifically outlaws such discrimination. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(c) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). For the text of this subsection, see note 11 supra.
50. 323 U.S. 248 (1944).
51. In Wallace, an independent union, having won a majority vote, was certified
as the bargaining representative. Id. at 250. For the pertinent text of the statutory
authority for this procedure, see note 52 infra. Subsequently, it was discovered that
the employer was extremely hostile to a rival union, the Congress of Industrial
Organizations (CIO), and that this hostility extended to every employee affiliated
with the CIO. 323 U.S. at 251-52. Before the independent union had become the
bargaining representative, it had entered into an agreement with the employer which
"plainly implied that the old employees could retain their jobs with the company
simply by becoming members of whichever union would win the election." Id. at 252.
After the election, however, the independent union and the employer entered into a
contract whereby the union had "the right to refuse membership to old CIO employees
who might jeopardize its majority." Id. This "resulted in bringing about the discharge
of a large bloc of CIO men and their president." Id.
52. 29 U.S.C. § 151(a) (1970). Section 9(a) provides in pertinent part:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective
bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such
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representation of the interests of its own group members. By its
selection as bargaining representative, it has become the agent
of all the employees, charged with the responsibility of
representing their interests fairly and impartially. Otherwise,
employees who are not members of a selected union at the time it
is chosen by the majority would be left without adequate
53
representation.
In this manner, Wallace established a duty of fair representation
under the NLRA.
B. Evolution of the Duty
1. Initial Limitations
On several occasions in the years following the Steele and
Wallace decisions, the Board attempted to apply the duty of fair
representation that the Supreme Court had found implicit in section
9(a) of the NLRA. For various reasons, however, attempts to expand
54
the duty were limited and ineffectual.
The first obstacle was the narrow scope of the Board's power
under the NLRA itself. For example, prior to the passage of the TaftHartley Act in 1947, 55 there were no provisions in the NLRA
covering unfair labor practices by unions;56 the original Wagner
Act 57 only defined unfair labor practices by employers. 58 Thus, the
purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit
for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours
of employment, or other conditions of employment.

Id. See Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1944). In spite of occasional cites
to Steele as the origin of the duty of fair representation under the NLRA, it should be
remembered that, strictly speaking, the Steele holding was based on the Railway
Labor Act. See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 5, at 13. See also notes 39-41 and
accompanying text supra.
53. 323 U.S. at 255-56.
54. In spite of the Steele and Wallace holdings, the duty of fair representation met
with some initial judicial resistance. See, e.g., Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, Local
23, 223 F.2d 739 (5th Cir.), rev'd per curiam, 350 U.S. 892 (1955), rehearingdenied, 350
U.S. 943 (1956). In Syres, the Fifth Circuit refused to apply the duty to a suit in which
the recognition of the duty was necessary for there to be federal question jurisdiction.
223 F.2d at 740-41. The Steele case was distinguished as follows: "'In considering this
question we must bear in mind that the plaintiffs [in the instant case] were all
members of the Union. This is the distinguishing factor which makes the rule of the
Steele case inapplicable to the facts of this case."' Id. at 742 (emphasis in original),
quoting Williams v. Yellow Cab Co., 200 F.2d 302, 304 (3d Cir. 1952).
55. Labor Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)
(Taft-Hartley Act).
56. Section 101 of the Taft-Hartley Act, inter alia, amended § 8 of the NLRA by
adding subsections (b)(1)-(7), which defined certain unfair labor practices by a "labor
organization or its agents ....
Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 101,61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified
in 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)-(7) (1970)).
57. National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (Wagner
Act).
58. See National Labor Relations Act, § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1970).
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Board had very limited authority, before 1947, to issue orders or to
take affirmative action against labor organizations that had
breached the duty of fair representation. 59 Accordingly, Board relief
against racial discrimination was restricted either to the defensive
measure of withholding certification of a petitioning labor organization or to the little-used, rather drastic sanction of revoking the
60
certification of a union holding exclusive representative status.
In addition to the inherent limitations of the NLRA itself, there
existed a serious conceptual failing in interpretation by the Board.
For approximately 15 years following the passage of the union
unfair labor practice section of the NLRA, 61 the duty of fair
representation was viewed as flowing solely from the representation
provisions of section 9 of the statute. 62 Therefore, the Board
perceived that the duty was limited to fair or equal representation in
the negotiation, application, and enforcement of collective bargaining agreements and did not view a union's racially discriminatory
63
membership policies as violative of its duty of fair representation.
Thus, the Board continued to certify segregated unions, holding that
"'neither exclusion from membership nor segregated membership
per se represents evasion on the part of a labor organization of its
statutory duty to afford "equal representation."' "64
2. Expansion - Miranda and Local 12
In the early 1960's, the Board approached the duty of fair
representation from a distinctly more aggressive posture. 65 The

59. Section 10 of the Wagner Act only gave the Board power to take action
against persons who engaged in § 8 unfair labor practices. National Labor Relations

Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 10(a), 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (Wagner Act). See text
accompanying note 58 supra.
60. See, e.g., Larus & Brother Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 1075, 1081-82 (1945) (after
certification had expired Board withheld recertification of union based on union's
violation of the § 9(a) duty of fair representation where union had originally been
certified to represent unit as a whole and had subsequently set up separate auxiliary
unit for black employees). For an example of the Board's decertification of a union
practicing racially discriminatory practices after the enactment of the Taft-Hartley
Act, see Independent Metal Workers Local 1, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573, 1578 (1964). See also
Cox, supra note 8, at 174-75; Meltzer, supra note 5, at 3-4.
61. See note 56 supra.
62. See Meltzer, supra note 5, at 3.
63. See, e.g., Atlanta Oak Flooring Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 973, 975 (1945); American
Tobacco Co., 9 N.L.R.B. 579, 584 (1938); Meltzer, supra note 5, at 3-4; Sovern, The
NationalLabor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination,62 COLUM. L. REV.563, 597
(1962).
64. Hill, The National Labor Relations Act and the Emergence of Civil Rights
Law: A. New Priorityin FederalLabor Policy, 11 HARV. CIv-RIGHTS Civ. LIB. L. REV.
299, 318 (1976), quoting 10 NLRB ANN. REP. 18 (1945).

65. Frank W. McCulloch was the chairman of the Board during the Kennedy
Administration.
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Board asserted for the first time in MirandaFuel Co.,86 that section 7

of the NLRA, 67 in addition to the previously recognized section 9,68
granted employees the right to be free from discriminatory conduct
on the part of their union in matters affecting their employment.6 9 In
Miranda, the employer and the union had entered into a contract
which gave the union exclusive control over the seniority status of
employees. 70 The union then proceeded to direct the employer to
lower one employee's seniority status solely because he had taken an
71
earlier leave of absence than was permitted under union policy.
There was no provision in the contract, however, for the lowering of
72
seniority status for this reason.
The Board first considered the duty of fair representation in the
context of the Steele case 73 and then went on to state:
Viewing these mentioned obligations of a statutory representative in the context of the "right" guaranteed employees by
section 7 of the [National Labor Relations] Act "to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing," we
are of the opinion that section 7 thus gives employees the right
to be free from unfair or irrelevant or invidious treatment by
their exclusive bargaining agent in matters affecting their
74

employment.

Therefore, the Board determined that there was a duty of fair
representation implicit in section 7 as well as in section 9 of the
NLRA.
The Board's findings, however, did not stop there. It further
concluded that a breach of the duty in the context of section 7
constituted an unfair labor practice. 75 More specifically, the Board

66. 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). See
Sovern, Race Discriminationand the National Labor Relations Act: The Brave New
World of Miranda, 16 N.Y.U. CONF. ON LAB. 3 (1963).
67. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). Section 7 provides in pertinent part:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have' the right to
refrain from any or all of such activities . ...

Id.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

See notes 50-53 and accompanying text supra.
140 N.L.R.B. at 185.
Id. at 181.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 184-85.
Id. at 185 (emphasis added).
Id. at 185-86.
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held that section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA76 prohibited labor organizations, when functioning as the exclusive representative of bargaining unit employees, from acting upon the basis of an arbitrary,
discriminatory, or irrelevant classification. 77 In addition, the Board
recognized that certain arbitrary union action which constituted a
breach of the duty of fair representation also violated section
8(b)(2). 78 As a corollary, the Board noted that to the extent an
employer participated in, or complied with, such union action, the
employer violated section 8(a)(3). 79 Relying on the Supreme Court's
discussion of these two NLRA sections in Radio Officers' Union v.
NLRB,80 the Board held that sections 8(b)(2) and 8(a)(3) had been
violated because the union's breach of the duty of fair representation
had the natural, inferrable "foreseeable effect"8 1 of encouraging or
discouraging union membership. 2 Thus, in an unprecedented
holding,8 3 the Board found violations of sections 8(b)(2) and 8(a)(3)
even though the motivation underlying the objectionable conduct
was not based directly on the employees' union membership or
activities.
The Board's holding in Miranda was served a temporary
setback, however, when the United States Court of Appeals for the
84
Second Circuit refused to enforce the Board's order in Miranda.
Enforcement was denied on the following ground:
[P]ractically everything a union does encourages union membership, and . . . it is necessary in a particular case to show that
the acts complained of were done with the unlawful intent and
76. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A). Section 8(b)(1)(A) makes it an unfair labor practice
"for a labor organization or its agents . . . to restrain or coerce . . . employees in the
exercise of' § 7 rights. Id. For the text of section 7, see note 67 supra.
77. 140 N.L.R.B. at 185. The Board concluded that such conduct would restrain or
coerce the § 7 rights of employees to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing. Id. See notes 67 & 76 supra.
78. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1970). Section 8(b)(2) makes it an unfair labor practice
"for a labor organization or its agents ... to cause or attempt to cause an employer to
discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a)(3) of this section
....
" Id. For the pertinent text of subsection 8(a)(3), see note 79 infra.
79. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970). Section 8(a)(3) makes it an unfair labor practice
"for an employer ... by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or
any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization ....
" Id. (emphasis added). See 140 N.L.R.B. at 186.
80. 347 U.S. 17, 44-48 (1954); see 140 N.L.R.B. at 190. The Radio Officers Court, in
the context of a § 8(a)(3) suit, stated that the "recognition that specific proof of intent
is unnecessary where employer conduct inherently encourages or discourages union
membership is but an application of the common-law rule that a man is held to intend
the foreseeable consequences of his conduct." 347 U.S. at 45.
81. 140 N.L.R.B. at 190.
82. Id.
83. See id. at 193-99 (McCulloch, Chairman, and Fanning, Member, dissenting).
84. NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172, 180 (2d Cir. 1963).
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purpose of encouraging employees to join the union. It is not
enough merely to show that the employer discriminated among
employees at the behest of the union. An unfair labor practice

has been committed only if the discrimination was deliberately
85
designed to encourage membership in the union.

Despite the Second Circuit's opinion, the Board continued to
adhere to the position that violations of the duty of fair representation constituted unfair labor practices by both the employer and the

union. 86 The Board's persistence was rewarded shortly thereafter
when the Fifth Circuit8 7 wholeheartedly adopted the Board's
Miranda position in Local Union No. 12, United Rubber Workers v.

NLRB. 8

Local 12, unlike Miranda, did involve

discrimination.8 9

racially motivated

In finding that the union's breach of its duty of fair

representation constituted an unfair labor practice, 9° the court
expressly noted that: "the complainants under our holding today
would be at liberty to seek redress under the enforcement provisions
of Title VII or to assert unfair labor practice charges before the

Board." 91 The Fifth Circuit emphasized that the legislative history
as well as specific provisions of Title VII made it apparent that
Congress did not intend to establish Title VII as the exclusive

remedy in the discrimination field. 92 On the other hand, the court
raised, but refrained from ruling on, the issue of whether the Board
should assert its jurisdiction over claims of discrimination covered
93
by Title VII that also involve assertions of unfair labor practices.
With this reservation, Local 12 and its progeny 94 have firmly

established that the NLRA's unfair labor practice provisions, 95 and
85. Id. at 180.
86. The Board is, of course, only completely bound by a Supreme Court decision.
Therefore, when the Second Circuit refused to accept the Board's Miranda position,
the Board was able to turn to the other circuits for support of its position. See Local
Union No. 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966).
87. The Fifth Circuit is perhaps the leader among federal courts of appeals in
establishing principles of discrimination law. See, e.g., Local 189 United Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969) (discrimination in seniority
system); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969) (sex
discrimination in hiring); Local Union No. 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368
F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966) (racial discrimination in union's processing of grievances).
88. 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
89. United Rubber Workers Local 12, 150 N.L.R.B. 312, 316-19 (1966). In Local 12,
black employees complained to the union about the employer's use of separate
seniority lists, segregated recreational facilities, and racially segregated plant
facilities. Id. The union refused to process these grievances, even though the
employees were covered by the collective bargaining agreement. Id.
90. 368 F.2d at 17.
91. Id. at 24.
92. Id. at 24 n.24, citing 110 CONG. REc. 13, 171 (1964).
93. 368 F.2d at 24 n.25.
94. E.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186 (1967).
95. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
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their related sanctions, 96 are available to victims of union or joint
union-employer racial discrimination. The significance of the Local
12 decision should not be underestimated. In effect, it gives the
Board free rein to exercise its broad remedial unfair labor practice
powers in order to achieve the goal of the elimination of racial
discrimination from the employment relationship. As one distinguished commentator 97 has explained:
In remedying an unfair labor practice, the Board is
authorized to take "such affirmative action.

. .

as will effectuate

the policies of the [NLRA]." In individual instances of discrimination, the orders might simply require the unions to terminate
their discrimination, give active representation to minority
employees, or pay damages to victims of union discrimination
who lose work opportunities. The Board's remedial power is also
sufficiently broad to permit more imaginative remedies in cases
of extensive union discriminatory practices. Thus, it can
decertify a discriminating union thereby depriving the union of
the [NLRA's] other protections. Moreover, it is probably
authorized to order major changes in union hiring hall systems
and alterations in a plant's seniority system to effectuate the
Act's policies by removing the present effects of prior discrimination. In this respect, the Board's remedial powers would appear
to be very similar to those of federal district courts operating
under Title VII. A number of innovative Title VII remedial
measures recently adopted by the courts appear to be equally
appropriate for NLRA violations. 98
IV.

VARYING JUDICIAL PERCEPTIONS OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE
AND TITLE

NLRA

VII

While the Miranda and Local 12 decisions certainly marked a
new era in discrimination law, they also ushered in a decade of
confusion concerning the interplay between the NLRA and Title VII.
After the appearance on the legal scene of Title VII, a unique statute
specifically created to eliminate discrimination from employment, 99
it became all the more necessary for the courts to define the Board's
role in race discrimination cases. In the years since the passage of

96. Id. § 160 (1970).

97. Lecker, The Current and PotentialEqual Employment Role of the NLRB, 1971
L.J. 833.

DUKE

98. Id. at 859 (footnotes omitted), quoting National Labor Relations Act, § 10(c),

29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970).
99. See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
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Title VII and the establishment of the Miranda doctrine, commentators' attempts to explain the proper or desired degree of interaction
between the NLRA and Title VII have proved largely unsuccessful. 10 ° The courts also have endeavored to define the relationship
between these two statutes and the principles of law handed down
under each. A brief review of a handful of the leading decisions will
demonstrate the confusion that exists today and establish that there
is unquestionably a need for clarification and guidance in this area.
A.

Sufficiency of Statistical Proof of Discriminatory Effect

United Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB,101 decided by the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in 1969, represents
one of the judiciary's farthest reaching examinations of the gray
area between the NLRA and Title VII and the nexus between them
racial discrimination. By the time of the decision, the Miranda
doctrine was quite well established, standing firmly for the
proposition that union or concerted union-employer race discrimination could be combatted by the Board through the NLRA's unfair
02
labor practice provisions based on the duty of fair representation.
In Packinghouse, however, the duty could not be applied directly,
since the alleged discrimination was executed by the employer,
acting without the assistance of the union. 10 3 The Board found that
the salaries paid to minorities were substantially lower than salaries
paid to whites for the same tasks. 10 4 The Board also determined that
the employer had shown preferences toward whites for higher
paying or more stable jobs, 10 5 and had discriminated against
minorities in off-the-job benefits.1° 6 Moreover, the Board found that
10 7
when the union that was certified to represent the employees
raised certain of these matters in negotiations with the employer, the
company "took evasive positions"' 0 8 and "failed to bargain in good
100. Compare Hill, supra note 64, at 344-48 and Comment, supra note 5, at 184-86,
with Meltzer, supra note 5, at 45 and The Impact of Mansion House, supra note 12, at
140-46.
101. 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969).

102. See 416 F.2d at 1134, citing United Rubber Workers Local 12, 150 N.L.R.B.
312 (1964), enforced, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967). For a
discussion of Local 12, see notes 88-98 and accompanying text supra. See also notes
66-85 and accompanying text supra.

103.
104.
105.
106.

416
See
See
See

F.2d at 1132.
id.
id.
id. It was alleged that the group fishing trips provided by the employer for

white employees were superior to the trips given to nonwhite employees. Id.
107. The United Packinghouse, Food and Allied Workers of the AFL-CIO had been
certified by the Board in 1965 to represent the company's production and maintenance

employees. See id. at 1129.
108, Id. at 1132.
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faith."'10 9 Since the employer was acting on its own, it was necessary
for the District of Columbia Circuit to look beyond the duty of fair
representation to hold that the employer had committed an unfair
labor practice. 110
The court went further than previous cases in concluding that
the conduct of the employer, engaged in independently of the union,
interfered with the employees' rights under section 7 of the NLRA"'
to "act concertedly for their own aid or protection,"11 2 and, thus, was
an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(1). 113 In the court's view,
the employer's interference was manifested in two ways:
(1) [R]acial discrimination sets up an unjustified clash of
interests between groups of workers which tends to reduce the
likelihood and the effectiveness of their working in concert to
achieve their legitimate goals under the [National Labor
Relations] Act; and (2) racial discrimination creates in its
victims an apathy or docility which inhibits them from asserting
their rights against the perpetrator of the discrimination. We
find that the confluence of these two factors sufficiently deters
4
the exercise of Section 7 rights as to violate Section 8(a)(1)."
The court remanded the Packinghouse case to the Board,"15 with
instructions to determine whether the facts supported a finding that
the employer had a policy or practice of discrimination against
employees on racial grounds." 6 On remand," 7 the Board ruled that,
although there was statistical evidence revealing racial imbalances, 1 8 this showing of discriminatory effect was insufficient to
establish a section 8(a)(1) violation." 9 The Board considered
evidence of a hostile intent or deliberate discrimination necessary
20
under the NLRA to support a finding of invidious discrimination.'
2
It is interesting to note that Board member Jenkins in dissent' '
109. Id.
110. In its initial discussion of the issue before it, the court noted the existence of
the duty as it applied to unions. Id. at 1134. Cf. note 79 and accompanying text supra.
111. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). For the pertinent text of this section, see note 67 supra.
112. 416 F.2d at 1135.
113. Id. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970). Section 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor
practice "for an employer ... to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of' § 7 rights. Id.
114. 416 F.2d at 1135 (emphasis in original).
115. Id. at 1130, 1138.
116. Id. If on remand the Board did make such a finding, it was to order an
appropriate remedy. Id.
117. Farmers' Cooperative Compress, 194 N.L.R.B. 85 (1971).
118. Id. at 89.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 90-93 (Jenkins, Member, dissenting).
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urged that the Title VII standard - statistical evidence of a
discriminatory effect is sufficient to support a finding of illegality should have been invoked by the Board. 122 Nevertheless, it appeared
that the Board was drawing a distinct line between the burdens of
proof required under the NLRA and Title VII.
In Jubilee ManufacturingCo.,' 23 the Board further distinguished
the principles of discrimination law under the NLRA and those
under Title VII by holding that discrimination on the basis of sex
was not automatically an unfair labor practice. 24 The Board stated:
[I]n our view, discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or
national origin, standing alone, which is all that is alleged
herein, is not "inherently destructive" of employees' Section 7
rights and therefore is not violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of
the [National Labor Relations] Act. There must be actual
evidence, as opposed to speculation, of a nexus between the
alleged discriminatory conduct and the interference with, or
restraint of, employees in the exercise of those rights protected
125
by the [National Labor Relations] Act.
126
Apparently retreating from its previous position in Miranda,
wherein the Board found an unfair labor practice based upon the
foreseeable result of the discrimination, 127 the Board went so far as
to reject the District of Columbia Circuit Court's legal conclusion in
Packinghouse that employer discrimination necessarily interfered
with employees' exercise of their section 7 rights. 128 In the opinion of
the Board, "[a]lthough employer discrimination may have the effect
of setting group against group, that result is by no means
inevitable.' ' 29 However, the Board went on to state:

This is not to say categorically that discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin is necessarily
or always beyond the reach of the statute. Such discrimination
122. Id. at 91 (Jenkins, Member, dissenting). The dissent specifically cited two Title
VII cases, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and Parham v.

Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970), which had held that once a
prima facie Title VII violation was established by a showing of racially disparate

effect, good faith of the alleged discriminator was not a valid defense. 401 U.S. at 432;
433 F.2d at 426. See 194 N.L.R.B. at 90-91 (Jenkins, Member, dissenting).
123. 202 N.L.R.B. 272, aff'd mem., 504 F.2d 271 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
124. 202 N.L.R.B. at 272. The complaint alleged that the employer had committed
unfair labor practices under §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) by discriminating in wage increase

grants. Id. For the pertinent portions of §§ 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3), see notes 79 & 113 supra.
125. 202 N.L.R.B. at 272 (emphasis added).
126. See notes 66-85 and accompanying text supra.
127. See text accompanying notes 81 & 82 supra.
128. 202 N.L.R.B. at 272; see text accompanying note 114 supra.
129. 202 N.L.R.B. at 272. It is interesting to note that the Packinghouse court, the
District of Columbia Circuit, was the court that affirmed the Board's Jubilee decision.
See note 123 supra.
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can be violative of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) in certain contexts
. ,**However, in each of these areas in which we have decided
issues involving discrimination, there has been the necessary
direct relationship between the alleged discrimination and our
traditionalandprimary functions of fostering collective bargaining, protecting employees' rights to act concertedly and
conducting elections . ... 130
Thus, it would appear that the Board was focusing upon the need for
a direct link between the discriminatory conduct and an interference
with Board functions before a finding of an unfair labor practice
could be made. Discrimination by an employer was not a per se
3
violation of the NLRA under the Jubilee decision.' '
The Eighth Circuit substantially complicated matters by its 1973
decision in NLRB v. Mansion House Center Management Corp.132 In
Mansion House, an employer refused to bargain with a painter's
union after labor disputes arose between the employer and its
painters.' 33 When the union obtained a bargaining order from the
Board, 3 4 the employer objected to the order on the ground that the
Board could not compel an employer to bargain with a union that
practiced racial discrimination in its membership. 135 In support of its
allegation that the union discriminated on the basis of race, the
employer offered evidence that the union's surrounding jurisdictional territory contained a population that was one-half nonwhite,
while of the union's 375 members, only three were nonwhite. 136 The
trial examiner refused to accept the proof offered because it failed to
establish that the union actually excluded minorities from membership, stating:
Respondent cannot make out a case of "de facto" segregation
merely on the basis of the population division it refers to.
130. 202 N.L.R.B. at 273 (emphasis added).
131. See notes 29-98 and accompanying text supra.
132. 473 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1973), denying enforcement of Mansion House Center
Management Corp., 190 N.L.R.B. 437 (1971). See Comment, Labor Unions and Title
VII: The Impact of Mansion House, 41 TENN. L. REV. 718 (1974); Note, The Impact of
De Facto Discriminationby Unions on the Availability of NLRB BargainingOrders,
47 S. Cal. L. REV. 1353 (1974).
133. Mansion House Center Management Corp., 190 N.L.R.B. 437, 438-41 (1971).
134. Id. at 441-43. The bargaining order was predicated on the trial examiner's
finding that the employer had committed unfair labor practices under § 8(a)(1), (3),
and (5) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(1), (3), (5) (1970). 190 N.L.R.B. at 442.
135. 190 N.L.R.B. at 441. Although not expressly discussed by the trial examiner, it
is apparent that the employer was asserting that the Board's remedial machinery
could not be made available to the union without constituting federal complicity in
illegal discrimination which would violate the fifth amendment of the United States
Constitution. See generally NAACP v. Federal Power Comm'n, 425 U.S. 662 (1976);
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948); Handy Andy, Inc. 228 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 94 L.R.R.M. 1354 (Feb. 25, 1977). For a
discussion of Handy Andy, see notes 214-18 and accompanying text infra.
136. 190 N.L.R.B. at 441.
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Rather, Respondent would have to establish that in actual
practice the Union has received membership applications from
blacks or other nonwhites and has rejected them on racially
137
discriminatory grounds.
The Eighth Circuit, however, denied enforcement of part of the
Board's order. 138 In the court's view, the requirements of due process
prohibited a federal agency such as the Board from recognizing and
enforcing illegal racial policies. 139 Thus, neither the Board nor the
courts could order an employer to bargain with a segregated
union. 140 The Eighth Circuit stated:
When a union discriminates on the basis of race or color it
invidiously deprives equal opportunity for employment to a large
segment of working men. When a governmental agency
recognizes such a union to be the bargaining representative it
significantly becomes a willing participant in the union's
discriminatory practices .... Moreover, here the Board seeks
judicial enforcement of its order requiring collective bargaining
in a federal court. Obviously, judicial enforcement of private
discrimination cannot be sanctioned.' 4'
This aspect of the court's holding is subject to criticism because,
as at least one commentator 42 has recognized, "the ultimate effect of
Mansion House is to inject the Board into Title VII decisionmaking."'143 In other words, Congress passed the NLRA in order to
facilitate collective bargaining by enabling employees to bargain
through representatives of their own choosing. 144 In Mansion House,
however, the Eighth Circuit required the Board not only to carry out
this policy, but also to effectuate the policy against racial discrimination by "refusing to carry out its statutory function of facilitating
collective bargaining when a union with a disproportionate racial
composition in its overall membership is the chosen bargaining
representative."1 45

137. Id. at 442.
138. 473 F.2d at 477. The court had previously enforced the Board's finding that
the employer had committed unfair labor practices under § 8(a)(1) and (3). Id. at 472,
citing NLRB v. Mansion House Center Management Corp., 466 F.2d 1283 (8th Cir.
1972). See note 134 supra.
139. 473 F.2d at 473.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. The Impact of Mansion House, supra note 12, at 133.
143. Id.
144. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
145. Note, supra note 132, at 1378.
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In addition to this aspect of its holding, Mansion House is
likewise precedential, controversial, and significant in another
respect. The court ruled that the trial examiner's refusal to receive
146 It
the statistical evidence offered by the employer was erroneous.
also found that the Board had used an improper standard in
determining whether the union could be certified in the light of the
discrimination charges. 147 According to the court, the evidentiary
standard imposed in Title VII cases was to be applied. Relying
entirely on Title VII cases, 148 the Eighth Circuit quoted from Chief
Justice Burger's opinion in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.' 49 and stated:
"[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not
redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that
operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are
unrelated to measuring job capability." The same principles
apply in the evaluation of the charge of discrimination here.
Thus, statistical evidence may well corroborate and establish
that a union has been guilty of racial practices in the past. In
face of such proof, passive attitudes of good faith are not
sufficient to erase the continuing stigma which may pervade a
union's segregated membership policies. The fact that no
minority applicanthas been rejected by the union is not the sole
test. When evidence suggesos discriminationor racialimbalance
the Board should inquire whether the union has taken the
50
initiative to affirmatively undo its discriminatorypractices.
Thus, the Mansion House decision blurs the line between the
NLRA and Title VII, making them legally interchangeable in racial
discrimination cases with respect to the definition of discrimination,
the burden of proof, and the availability of defenses. In the eyes of
the Eighth Circuit, at least, Title VII and the NLRA are one and the
same in race discrimination cases. 51
A recent Supreme Court opinion appears, by logical extension, to
shed some light on the question of whether or not the evidentiary
standards imposed by Title VII are synonymous with those of the
NLRA where the jurisdiction of the two statutes overlap. Prior to
discussing the Washington v. Davis5 2 decision, however, it should
146. 473 F.2d at 475; see text accompanying notes 136 & 137 supra.
147. 473 F.2d at 475.
148. Id. at 475-76, citing Turner v. Foulke, 396 U.S. 346 (1970), Marquez v. Omaha
Dist. Sales Office, Ford Div., 440 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir. 1971), and Parham v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970).
149. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
150. 473 F.2d at 477 (emphasis added), quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 432 (1971). Cf. text accompanying note 137 supra.
151. See generally Comment, supra note 132; Note, supra note 132.
152. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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be remembered that Steele originally had imposed an equal
protection obligation on unions that had exclusive representative
status. 15 3 In Steele, the Court had noted that, absent a judicial
requirement of a duty of fair representation, serious constitutional
15 4
problems would have arisen.
In Washington v. Davis, the Court found that the duties imposed
by Title VII on employers were more exacting than those found
under the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.1 55 In this regard, the Court unequivocally stated that proof of a
discriminatory purpose is an essential element in an equal protection
claim.1 56 The Court noted that Title VII, in contrast to the
constitutional equal protection clause, involves a more probing
review of, and less deference to, seemingly reasonable acts which are
alleged to be discriminatory. 1 57 This distinction was made particularly obvious in the Washington v. Davis case because racial impact,
58
but no discriminatory purpose, was asserted.
According to Washington v. Davis, impact is only one factor to
be considered for a finding of discrimination under the equal
protection clause.15 9 The Court stated that "[d]isproportionate
impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an
invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution.
Standing alone, it does not trigger the rule that racial classifications
are to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by
the weightiest of considerations." 16 0 According to the Court,
however, under Title VII standards evidence of discriminatory effect,
without proof of discriminatory purpose, establishes a prima facie
16
case. '
Cases under the NLRA traditionally are subject to a two-tiered
standard that is distinguishable from that employed under Title VII.
In NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc.,162 an employer was found
guilty of an unfair labor practice for refusing to pay equal benefits to
strikers and nonstrikers. 163 The Supreme Court reviewed earlier
153. See note 45 and accompanying text supra.
154. See notes 43-45 and accompanying text supra.
155. See 426 U.S. at 238-39.
156. Id. at 245.
157. Id. at 247.
158. Id. at 235.
159. Id. at 242.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 246-47. Cases under Title VII have made it apparent that employers'
good faith defenses are insufficient to rebut a prima facie case. See, e.g., Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 423 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
432 (1971).
162. 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
163. Id. at 35.
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decisions that involved the issue of requiring antiunion motivation
to establish an unfair labor practice violation 164 and then explained:
[I]f it can reasonably be concluded that the employer's
discriminatory conduct was "inherently destructive" of important employee rights, no proof of an antiunion motivation is
needed and the Board can find an unfair labor practice even if
the employer introduces evidence that the conduct was motivated by business considerations. . . . [I]f the adverse effect of

the discriminatory conduct on employee rights is "comparatively
slight," an antiunion motivation must be proved to sustain the
charge if the employer has come forward with evidence of
legitimate and substantial business justifications for the con5
duct. 16
Although one commentator has suggested that, after Great
Dane, the differences between the Title VII and NLRA evidentiary
burdens of proof are more illusion than fact, 1 66 Washington v. Davis
may widen the gap. In light of the language in Steele to the effect
that constitutional principles govern union certification by the
Board,' 67 the impact of Washington v. Davis appears to be
somewhat uncertain. It may be surmised, however, that even where
their jurisdictions overlap, Title VII and NLRA evidentiary
standards are not identical. 168 Rather, NLRA cases involving
allegations of race discrimination should be examined under the
traditional principles set forth in Great Dane. In these instances,
evidence of grossly disproportionate racial imbalances may be
utilized as one factor in the ultimate holding, with other factors,
such as good faith or lack of discriminatory intent, available for
rebuttal.
B. The NLRA and Title VII as Concurrent Remedies
In addition to the uncertainty concerning the standards of proof
to be applied in NLRA discrimination cases,'6 9 there also was a
considerable lack of uniformity in the circuits as to whether
164. Id. at 33-34, citing American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 311
(1965), NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 287 (1965), and NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373

U.S. 221, 227 (1963).
165. 388 U.S. at 34 (emphasis in original); see notes 154-56. See also Farmers'
Cooperative Compress, 194 N.L.R.B. 85, 89 (1971) (Packinghouse remand). For a
discussion of Compress, see notes 117-22 and accompanying text supra.
166. Comment, The Civil Rights Potential of the Labor Management Relations
Act, 12 DUQ. L. REV. 23, 43-44 (1973).
167. See notes 43-45 and accompanying text supra.
168. For a discussion of the Title VII standards, as articulated by Washington v.
Davis, see text accompanying note 161 supra. See also notes 153-61 supra.
169. For a discussion of the ways in which Mansion House changed existing law,
see Note, supra note 132, at 1366-67.
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discriminatory employment practices based on the same set of facts
could be challenged concurrently under the NLRA and Title VII.170
Fortunately, the Supreme Court simplified this issue somewhat for
those bent on explaining the relationship between the two statutes in
Alexander v.Gardner-DenverCo.171 In Alexander, a black employee
of the Gardner-Denver Company was discharged because of his
allegedly unacceptable work performance. 172 The employee filed a
grievance under a collective bargaining agreement asserting that he
had been wrongfully discharged 173 and, in a subsequent step of the
grievance process, 7 4 he claimed that his discharge was a result of
racial discrimination by the employer. 1 75 Prior to the resolution of
his grievance, the employee filed a Title VII claim which was
forwarded to the EEOC. 176 The arbitrator in the grievance process
then determined that the employee's dismissal was "for just
77
cause."1
Subsequently, in the Title VII suit, the EEOC determined that
there was no reasonable cause to believe that Title VII had been
violated.17 8 Nevertheless, the employee instituted a Title VII
action. 79 Although the district court and the Tenth Circuit
dismissed the employee's suit on the ground that his claim of racial
discrimination had been resolved against him by the arbitrator in
the grievance procedure,'8 ° the Supreme Court reversed.' 8' The Court
held that an arbitration decision unfavorable to an employee who
challenged his employer's discriminatory practices did not foreclose
the employee's statutory right to a subsequent trial de novo under
Title VII based on the same set of facts. 82 The Court believed that
170. See, e.g., Oubickon v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1973);
Rios v. Reynolds Metal Co., 467 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1972); Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co.,

429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd mer. by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689
(1971); Hutching v. United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970); Bowe v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
171. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
172. Id. at 38.
173. Id. at 39.
174. The grievance procedure consisted of four negotiation sessions between the
employer and the union. Id. at 40-41. If this proved to be fruitless, the final step was
compulsory arbitration. Id.
175. Id. at 42. The employee raised his allegation of racial discrimination for the
first time during the final prearbitration step of the grievance process. Id. See note 174
supra.
176. 415 U.S. at 42.
177. See id.
178. Id. at 43.
179. See id.
180. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 346 F. Supp. 1012, 1019 (D. Colo. 1971),
aff'd per curiam, 466 F.2d 1209 (10th Cir. 1972). See notes 173-77 and accompanying
text supra.
181. 415 U.S. at 43.
182. Id. at 59-60.
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the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes and the
federal policy against discriminatory employment practices could
best be made coexistent by allowing the employee to pursue both the
NLRA and Title VII processes fully.183 In so holding, the Court
proclaimed:
[L]egislative enactments in this area have long evinced a
general intent to accord parallel or overlapping remedies against
discrimination. In the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress
indicated that it considered the policy against discrimination to
be of the "highest priority.". . . And, in general, submission of a
claim to one forum does not preclude a later submission to
another. Moreover, the legislative history of Title VII manifests
a Congressional intent to allow an individual to pursue
independently his rights under both Title VII and other
applicable state and federal statutes. The clear inference is that
Title VII was designed to supplement, rather than supplant,
existing laws and institutions relating to employment discrimi4
nation. 8
The Court also referred in a footnote to an interpretative memorandum of the Title VII bill introduced by one of its sponsors, Senator
Joseph Clark. 185 The memorandum stated:
"Nothing in title VII or anywhere else in this bill affects rights
and obligations under the NLRA and the Railway Labor
Act ....
[T]itle VII is not intended to and does not deny to any
individual, rights and remedies which he may pursue under
other Federal and State statutes. If a given action should violate
both title VII and the National Labor Relations Act, the
National Labor Relations Board would not be deprived of
6
jurisdiction."18
Quite clearly, on the basis of Alexander, one may safely
conclude that nothing in Title VII precludes the Board from
asserting jurisdiction over race discrimination cases in which the
NLRA has also allegedly been violated. However, the Alexander
decision did not directly address the question of whether Title VII
and the NLRA are parallel, largely interchangeable remedies
against discrimination, as the Eighth Circuit had indicated in
Mansion House,187 or overlapping but independent areas of the law.
The resolution of this issue was saved for another day.
183. See id. at 47-49.
184. Id. at 47-48, (footnotes and citations omitted), quoting Newman v. Piggie
Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
185. 415 U.S. at 48 n.9.
186. Id., fqoting 110 CONG. REC. 7207 (1964).
187. See notes 132-51 and accompanying next supra.
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That day came early in 1975, when Emporium Capwell Co. v.
Western Addition Community Organization8 8 was decided. In
Emporium, the union, under a collective bargaining agreement with
the employer, invoked a grievance procedure to air certain allegations that the employer was engaging in racially discriminatory
practices.1 8 9 A few of the employees, however, feeling that grievance
procedures were inadequate, refused to participate and, against the

advice of the union, picketed the employer's premises.'19 When the
employer fired the picketing employees, they, through a local civil
rights organization, filed charges against the employer with the
Board.1 91 Their claim alleged that the employer had engaged in an
92
unfair labor practice in violation of section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA.'
The Board dismissed the complaint, 193 however, believing that a
contrary holding would undermine the statutory system of bargaining collectively through an exclusive representative, to everyone's
94
detriment.

On review, the District of Columbia Circuit reversed,' 95 recognizing the "unique status" that concerted activity to combat racial
discrimination possesses in light of Title VII.196 In the court's view,
188. 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
189. Id. at 53.
190. Id. at 55.
191. Id. at 56-57.
192. Id. at 57, citing National Labor Relations Act, § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)
(1970). For the text of this subsection, see note 113 supra. The picketing employees
asserted that the employer's action interfered with their § 7 rights to take concerted
action for collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. 420 U.S. at 57.
193. The Emporium, 192 N.L.R.B. 173, 186 (1971).
194. Id. at 186. The Board stated in its decision:
[T]o extend the protection of the [National Labor Relations] Act to the two
employees named in the complaint would seriously undermine the right of
employees to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
handicap and prejudice the employees' duly designated representative in its
efforts to bring about a durable improvement in working conditions among
employees belonging to racial minorities, and place on the Employer an
unreasonable burden of attempting to placate self-designated representatives of
minority groups while abiding by the terms of valid bargaining agreement and
attempting in good faith to meet whatever demands the bargaining representative put forth under that agreement.
Id.
195. Western Addition Community Org. v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917, 932 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
196. Id. at 927. The court stated:
The right to be free of racially discriminatory employment practices does not
depend upon the presence of an anti-discrimination clause in a collective
bargaining agreement, but is firmly rooted in the law [Title VII] ....
Not only does concerted activity involving racial discrimination have a
unique status in that the subject matter has independent statutory bases, but
section 704(a) of Title VII precludes an employer from discharging employees in
retaliation for peaceful picketing of the employer's business in protest of
allegedly discriminatory racial practices.
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the importance of such activity was paramount. 197 The court also
stated that any inconvenience to the employer in having to bargain
with splinter groups while still participating in normal union
grievance procedures did not necessarily justify withdrawing section
7 protection from the picketing employees.1S9
The Supreme Court reversed the District of Columbia Circuit
decision. 199 The Court held that, although concerted conduct such as
the picketing in the instant case, might indeed be protected under
Title VII,2°° there was no exception under the NLRA to the principle
of recognizing a collective bargaining agent as the exclusive
employee representative. 20 1 In so holding, the Court considered the
employees' assertions that the employer had to bargain with the
dissident employees in order to comply fully with his Title VII
obligations 2° 2 and responded:
This argument confuses the employees' substantive right to
be free of racial discrimination with the procedures available
under the NLRA for securing these rights. Whether they are
thought to depend upon Title VII or have an independent source
in the NLRA, they cannot be pursued at the expense of the
orderly collective-bargaining process contemplated by the
203
NLRA.
The Court soundly rejected the notion that in discrimination cases
Title VII and the NLRA are conceptually one and the same or
somehow interchangeable, stating:
Even assuming that [Title VII] protects employees' picketing
and instituting a consumer boycott of their employer, the same
conduct is not necessarily entitled to affirmative protection from
the NLRA. Under the scheme of that Act, conduct which is not
protected concerted activity may lawfully form the basis for the
participants' discharge. That does not mean that the discharge
is immune from attack on other statutory grounds in an
appropriate case. If the discharges in this case are violative of
. . . Title VII, the remedial provisions of that title provide the
197. Id.
198. Id. at 931.
199. 420 U.S. at 73.
200. Id. at 71.
201. Id. at 70. See 29 U.S.C. § 151(a) (1970). For the pertinent text of this section,
see note 52 supra. Thus, in light of the union's exclusive status as the bargaining
representative of all employees, the right of minority employees to make independent
demands on their employer could not be recognized. 420 U.S. at 70.
202. 420 U.S. at 69.
203. Id.
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means by which ... [the employees] may recover their jobs with
20 4
back pay.
It is clear, therefore, that the Emporium Court was emphasizing
the need to focus upon the NLRA as a collective bargaining statute.
The elimination of employment discrimination, while an important
goal, is not the NLRA's primary goal; rather, this is the function of
Title VII. The Court's assertion of this distinction in Emporium was
thus an admirable step toward clarification of the interrelationship
between the two statutes.
V.

THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE UNDER THE

Bekins

AND

NLRA

-

Handy Andy

The Supreme Court has not as yet directly addressed the issue
posed in Mansion House20 5 concerning whether or not the Board is
precluded from permitting an allegedly discriminating union or
employer to avail itself of Board machinery because of the state
action doctrine embodied in the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. 20 6 The Board, however, has attempted to fill the void in
this area by answering the question on its own.
In Bekins Moving & Storage Co. of Florida,Inc.,2 7 an employer
argued that the union seeking to be certified as the exclusive
representative was disqualified from certification because it practiced invidious discrimination. 208 It was asserted that the Board, as
an agency of the federal government, was subject to the limitations
of the due process clause of the fifth amendment, and, therefore,
certification could not be granted without considering the allegations of the union's inability to fairly represent employees. 20 9 The
Board accepted the employer's argument, ruling that a union
practicing discrimination could not be certified. 2 10 The Board
concluded that certifying the union would place the Board "in the
constitutionally indefensible position of knowingly furthering those

204. Id. at 71-72 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
205. See notes 132-41 and accompanying text supra.
206. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Supreme Court has, however, discussed the state
action doctrine in other contexts. See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163,
177 (1972) (state grant of liquor license to private club practicing racial discrimination
does not constitute state action within the ambit of the equal protection clause of the

fourteenth amendment). For a discussion of Moose Lodge, see notes 216-17 and
accompanying text infra. Cf. NAACP v. Federal Power Comm'n, 425 U.S. 662 (1976).
207. 211 N.L.R.B. 138 (1974).
208. Id. at 138. The employer argued that the union had discriminated on the basis
of sex and against Spanish-speaking and Spanish surnamed individuals. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 139.
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practices which are prohibited by both constitutional and statutory
2 11
provision."
On the issue of whether certification by the Board constituted
sufficient state action to bring due process considerations into play,
the Board stated:
Were we, as an arm of the Federal Government, to confer the
benefits of a certification upon a labor organization which is
shown to be engaging in a pattern and practice of invidious
discrimination, the power of the Federal Government would
surely appear to be sanctioning, and indeed furthering, the
continued practice of such discrimination, thereby running
afoul
21 2
of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Additionally, the Board held that the issue of the union's
discriminatory practices could be raised after the union was elected
as exclusive representative, but prior to certification, if the objections
'213
to certification were "properly substantiated.
In a manner characteristic of the instability of the law in this
area, a subsequently realigned Board overruled Bekins in Handy
Andy, Inc. 21 4 The employer there relied on Bekins to support the

contention that the union's allegedly discriminatory practices
precluded the Board from certifying the union as the exclusive
2 15
bargaining agent.

In rejecting the Bekins' interpretation of the state action
doctrine, the Board discussed the Supreme Court's holding in Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis.216 The Board particularly noted the following
statement from Moose Lodge:
"The Court has never held, of course, that discrimination by
an otherwise private entity would be violative of the Equal
211. Id. One commentator has criticized the Board for going beyond its jurisdiction
by deciding constitutional issues. Meltzer, supra note 5, at 20 n.93.
212. 211 N.L.R.B. at 138-39.
213. Id. at 141. While this was the position of Chairman Miller and Member
Jenkins, Member Kennedy in his concurrence asserted that the duty of fair
representation did not arise until after a union was certified. Id. at 145 (Kennedy,
Member, concurring). Therefore, the entire Bekins case, according to the concurring
member, was not timely raised. Id.
214. 228 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 94 L.R.R.M. 1354 (Feb. 25, 1977).
215. 228 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1355. In support of its contention, the
employer also cited three Fifth Circuit cases which had held that certain provisions of
other employers' agreements to which the union in Handy Andy was a party "were
unlawful [under Title VIII because they perpetuated the effects of the employers' past
discriminations." Id., citing Resendis v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 505 F.2d 69 (5th
Cir. 1974), Herrera v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 505 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1974), and
Rodriguez v. East Tex. Motor Freight System, Inc., 505 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1974) rev'd in
part, 431 U.S. 395 (1977).
216. 228 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1356. See 407 U.S. 163 (1972). The Board
also relied on the Supreme Court's reasoning in Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369
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Protection Clause if the private entity receives any sort of
benefit or service at all from the State, or if it is subject to state
regulation in any degree whatever.

.

.

. [S]uch a holding would

utterly emasculate the distinction between private as distinguished from state conduct. .

.

. Our holdings indicate that

where the impetus for the discrimination is private, the state
must have 'significantly involved itself with invidious discriminations'.

. .

in order for the discriminatory action to fall within

'
the ambit of the constitutional prohibition.

217

Thus, in the Board's view, as manifested by the Handy Andy
decision, certification alone does not constitute sufficient involvement in the union's unlawful discrimination to support a finding of
state action. Instead, unfair labor practice proceedings after the
union is certified apparently are now perceived by the Board to be
the means by which it can intervene to prevent union discrimination. It seems, therefore, that the Board has determined that its
primary mandate is to effectuate the policies of the NLRA by
addressing issues of discrimination in a more coordinated fashion.
By deciding discrimination issues in full adversarial unfair labor
practice proceedings, the Board is better able to carry out its function
of facilitating the collective bargaining process. For example, the
period of uncertainty that is likely to arise if a union is disqualified
prior to certification, leaving employees without a representative for
the duration of the Board's determination of the union's allegedly
discriminatory practices, is eliminated by the Handy Andy deci218
sion.
VI. DISCUSSION AND PROPOSALS
Since the advent of Title VII and its substantial accompanying
body of case law, the duty of fair representation as a vehicle to
combat discrimination has been and is clearly still passing through
a period of transition. It appears to be a period in which the courts
and the Board are attempting to grapple with the source and scope
of the duty. Unfortunately, however, as the above review has shown,
these bodies simply have not yet "gotten their acts together."
Although the duty of fair representation was created by the courts, it
has been the judiciary which has had the most difficulty of late in
defining with clarity the scope of the duty.
(1967), Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963), and Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948), all of which had expanded the scope of the state action doctrine.

217. 228 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1357, quoting Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 177 (1972) (emphasis in original).
218. Nevertheless, the courts have yet to rule in this area; therefore the impact of
Handy Andy remains uncertain.
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The problems have arisen in part because, in seeking to
determine its scope, the circuit courts have largely ignored the source
of the duty -

2
the Supreme Court's Steele and Wallace decisions. 19

Only by returning to its source can one hope to determine the
relation of the duty of fair representation to Title VII. As previously
stated, the Court in Steele had found that the duty was derived from
the statutory obligations and the policies of the NLRA. 22° Similarly,
the Court there found that a union's duty was at least as exacting as
2 21
that imposed upon Congress by the equal protection clause.
In holding that the Board must apply Title VII burdens of proof,
precedents, legal principles, and evidentiary standards, 222 some
circuit courts have not properly acknowledged or interpreted the
223
direction which the Supreme Court has taken recently in this area.

The Emporium case, 22 4 for example, clearly put the courts on notice
that they must return to the principles enunciated in Steele. 225 The
Emporium opinion suggested that the duty of fair representation is
226
derived from and imposed by its statutory source - the NLRA.
This recognition in Emporium implies that holdings involving the
duty should be consistent with the specific policies and purposes of
that statute, which are separate and distinct from the mandates of
Title VII.227
The Supreme Court in Emporium determined that even though
national policy favors the eradication of racial discrimination, 228 the
identity, purposes, and policies of the NLRA are independent of Title
VII and must be so maintained. 229 Thus, in light of Emporium, it is
apparent that the Court considers that, while the NLRA is in some
respects a discrimination statute, its overriding purpose is the
regulation and preservation of a stable collective bargaining
system.2 30 In this manner, the Court indicated that there are some
219.
220.
221.
222.

See notes 33-53 and accompanying text supra.
See text accompanying notes 46-49 supra.
See notes 43-45 and accompanying text supra.
See, e.g., NLRB v. Mansion House Center Management Corp., 473 F.2d 471,

473 (8th Cir. 1973). For a discussion of the Eighth Circuit's holding in Mansion House,
see notes 138-51 and accompanying text supra. See also United Packinghouse
Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 903 (1969).
223. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50
(1975). Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); NAACP v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 425 U.S. 662 (1976).

224. See notes 188-204 and accompanying text supra.
225. See 420 U.S. at 62-64. For a discussion of Steele, see notes 33-49 and
accompanying text supra.
226. See text accompanying note 204 supra.
227. Id.
228. 420 U.S. at 66.
229. Id. at 66-68. Cf. NAACP v. Federal Power Comm'n, 425 U.S. 662, 671 (1976).
230. 420 U.S. at 70.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol23/iss1/4

30

Roth: The Relationship between Title VII and the NLRA: Getting Our Acts
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 23: p. 68

instances in which Title VII - a statute specifically directed against
discrimination - offers an exclusive means of relief to victims of
discrimination, particularly where such relief is not best accomplished under the NLRA.2 31 Moreover, the Court emphasized that the
provisions of the NLRA cannot be ignored, even where an important
232
issue such as discrimination is involved.
It is clear that Title VII and the NLRA are parallel and
overlapping statutes which are concurrently available to remedy
acts of racial discrimination in employment. Nothing in Title VII
limits the Board's powers to hear discrimination cases. With the
expanded use of Title VII in recent years, however, one may question
the wisdom of making the limited resources of the Board available in
every case of alleged racial discrimination. In other words, in light of
the judicial confusion as expressed in the cases, it is time for the
Board formally to define its role in race discrimination cases.
In 1966, Arnold Ordman, then General Counsel to the Board,
informally stated the Board's policy as follows:
The National Labor Relations Act is primarily designed as a law
concerned with problems of labor-management relations and
organizational rights rather than racial discrimination. On the
other hand, Title VII . . . is aimed directly at racial discrimination ....
Administrative agencies have been adjured to

accommodate the policies developed in the administration of the
law to be administered by the agency with the policies of other
federal agencies administering other federal statutes in appropriate cases .

. .

. In any particularcase, therefore, my policy is to

examine the particular factual situation and to make a
determination to defer or not to defer, as the case may be, on the
basis of my judgment as to whether deferral will best effectuate
the intent of Congress. I have deferred action in some cases on
charges involving racial discrimination where charges have also
been filed with the Equal Employment Commission where it
appears that the Commission is actively investigating and if
permitted to act might well be able to dispose of the case more
233
expeditiously or more effectively than the Board could.

In this author's view, the case-by-case approach is no longer
sufficient. Instead, the Board, through its rulemaking powers, should
enunciate one uniform and understandable policy to regulate its
examination of race discrimination cases. Perhaps the Board should
231. See id. at 66-72.
232. See id.; Jones, supra note 3, at 29.
233. Letter from Arnold Ordman to Senator Jacob Javits (November 18, 1966),
reprinted in Hill, supra note 64, at 336.
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limit its review to those cases of alleged discrimination which
directly impact upon or impair the collective bargaining system,
such as the negotiation, interpretation, and application of the
collective bargaining agreement.
Furthermore, it is submitted that the Board should issue rules or
policy statements establishing the requisite nexus between the goals
of eliminating racially discriminatory action and maintaining the
integrity of the collective bargaining system. The Board could then
actively pursue those cases meeting the express standards, and could
defer -

but retain jurisdiction over -

other cases involving

allegations of racial discrimination that do not satisfactorily comply
with those standards. Under this approach, in some instances the
NLRA actually might extend further than the reach of Title VII, by
providing greater protection against the present effects of past
discrimination, a protection presently not permitted under Title
VII.234 On the other hand, those cases involving only subtle forms of
discrimination, such as those based solely on statistical racial
imbalances, may best be left for the EEOC to remedy under Title
VII's stricter duties, more liberal evidentiary standards, and more
lenient burden of proof. In any event, where its procedures or policies
remain confusing, the Board would be advised to rework them, 235 so
that the purposes behind the NLRA may be best served in a coherent
manner.
234. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 360-61
(1977) (Title VII's protections were not intended to eliminate present effects of
formerly discriminatory seniority system). Cf. Houston Maritime Ass'n, 168 N.L.R.B.
615 (1967). In Houston, there is some support for the proposition that the NLRA might
be successfully employed in such cases. Id. at 617.
235. See, e.g., Handy Andy, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 94 L.R.R.M. 1354 (Feb. 25,
1977). For a discussion of the Handy Andy decision, see notes 214-18 and
accompanying text supra.
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